We uncover a significant friction in small business lending: perception of risk by Small Business Administration employees. Using novel data on SBA employees transferring across offices, we find that defaults on SBA loans in their previous location reduce SBA loans and job creation in their current location. The effect is independent of local economic conditions and the informational content of the non-local defaults, suggesting that SBA employees update their risk assessment irrationally. Our results are the first to document that regulators' potential misperception of economic conditions affects the ability of small businesses to obtain access to finance.

Bankruptcy reforms that improve lenders’ ability to recover claims from financially distressed borrowers can mitigate zombie lending. However, we show that after a 2016 bankruptcy reform in India, lenders are reluctant to recognize zombie credit as nonperforming, impeding reform efficacy. A subsequent complementary regulation targeting lender discretion in recognizing nonperforming assets improves zombie recognition fivefold. The lender disincentive to recognize zombies arises from undercapitalized banks’ reluctance to realize loan losses and political economy frictions at state-owned banks. Resolving zombie credit allows lenders to redirect credit to healthy borrowers, but effects are muted at banks more exposed to zombie borrowers.

We establish that macroprudential controls limiting capital flows can curb risks arising from foreign currency borrowing by corporates in emerging markets. Firm-level data show that Indian firms tend to issue more foreign currency debt when the interest rate differential between India and the U.S. is higher. This “carry trade” relationship, however, breaks down once regulators institute more stringent interest rate caps on borrowing; in response, riskier borrowers cut issuance most. Prior to adoption of this macroprudential measure, stock price exposure of issuers to currency risk rises after issuance, as witnessed during the “taper tantrum” episode of 2013; this source of vulnerability is nullified by the measure, as confirmed during the October 2018 oil price shock and the COVID-19 outbreak. We find no evidence of the policy’s efficacy being undermined by leakage or regulatory arbitrage.

We build a risk management model that incorporates variable capital utilization and time-varying collateral capacity. The former lets firms optimally choose capital utilization, and hence production, which affects capital depreciation and risk exposure. The latter means firms’ ability to borrow and hedge increases with expected earnings and thus utilization. Calibrated solutions show both ingredients matter for firm value. We test the novel model predictions using a new data set of oil and gas producers. Consistent with model predictions, we find utilization is negatively correlated with firm liquidity, while hedging is positively correlated with liquidity and expected profitability.

Regulators can leave their government position for a job in a regulated firm. Using granular payroll data on 2.4 million federal employees, we uncover the first systematic evidence of revolving door incentives. We exploit the fact that post-employment restrictions on federal employees, which reduce the value of their outside option, trigger when the employee's base salary exceeds a threshold. We document significant bunching of salaries just below the threshold, consistent with a deliberate effort to preserve private sector job opportunities. The effect is concentrated among agencies with broad regulatory powers, minimal supervision by elected officials, and frequent interactions with high-paying industries. In those agencies, 42% of the regulators respond to revolving door incentives and sacrifice 6.4% of their wage potential to stay below the threshold. Consistent with theories of regulatory capture, we find that revolving regulators initiate fewer and less impactful enforcement actions. Using our findings to calibrate a structural model, we show that eliminating the restriction will increase the incentive distortion in the federal government by 3.2%. Combined, our results shed new light on the economic implications of the revolving door in the government.

We argue that heightened regulation on large banks contributed to the rise in fragility of smaller banks revealed by the 2023 regional bank crisis. In 2018, regulators restricted Wells Fargo, the third largest U.S. bank, from growing its total assets. We estimate this asset cap led Wells Fargo to give up deposits amounting to 2.2% of aggregate bank deposits. These deposits, primarily uninsured, were reallocated to smaller, less regulated banks geographically proximate to Wells Fargo. In turn, these banks experienced higher deposit outflows once monetary tightening commenced and saw their stock prices plummet during the 2023 stress.

I study the relative importance of lending and deposit-taking for bank value in failed bank acquisitions. Comparing outcomes for winning banks to runner-up bidders in failed bank auctions, I find winners experience a 2.3% abnormal return and this increase is mainly due to deposits, not loans. After acquisition, the winning bank cuts lending to the failed bank's borrowers and closes branches but it retains almost all acquired deposits. These deposits are not channeled into lending elsewhere. Rather, the acquirer lowers deposit rates, reflecting increased market power. Declines in lending due to the acquisition have negative local economic effects.