We study how regulatory interventions can bridge the gap between the passage of bankruptcy laws and their effective implementation. In 2016, India introduced a bankruptcy law giving creditors the power to refer defaulting borrowers to a quasi-judicial body for resolution. Using supervisory data on the universe of large bank-borrower relationships, we examine the likelihood of loans being classified as distressed, a precursor to starting bankruptcy proceedings. We find that the bankruptcy law had only a limited impact on banks classifying loans as distressed, and this impact was particularly muted for larger borrowers. Consequently, the law change had minimal impact on credit allocation and borrower behavior. However, a 2018 regulatory intervention from the central bank compelling all banks to immediately recognize defaulting borrowers and to refer them for bankruptcy proceedings resulted in a 60 percent increase in recognition of distressed assets, though with more muted effects in weaker banks. Identifying effects based on bank-borrower size thresholds targeted by the intervention, we show that the regulatory action led to reallocation of credit from distressed firms to creditworthy firms in the same industry. Overall, our results indicate that regulatory action might be necessary, above and beyond bankruptcy reform, to target “zombie” lending in the presence of an undercapitalized banking system.

Banks create value by issuing deposits and making loans, yet little is known about the relative importance of these two functions. I study this question in the setting of failed bank auctions. This allows me to obtain causal estimates by comparing outcomes for the winning bank to those of the second highest bidder. Consistent with a positive value effect from the acquisition, the winning bank experiences a large positive abnormal return upon announcement of the auction result. I show that this increased value is mainly due to deposits, not loans. After the acquisition, the winning bank sharply cuts lending to the failed bank’s borrowers, including those who were not responsible for the bank’s failure. However, the winning bank retains almost all of the failed bank’s deposits, despite shutting down some of its branches. It does not channel these deposits into lending in other areas, indicating that the value of deposits is separate from their role in financing loans. Rather, it lowers deposit rates throughout its network, reflecting increased deposit market power. Overall, my results show that the deposit franchise is the main source of value in these acquisitions, and hence likely a principal source of bank value more broadly.

We study the causes and consequences of the rise in foreign currency borrowing by non-financial corporates in an emerging market over the last decade. Using detailed firm-level issuance data from India, we show that issuance propensity for the same firm is higher when the difference in short-term interest rates between India and the US are higher i.e. when the dollar ‘carry trade’ is more profitable; a phenomenon that is driven by the period after the global financial crisis. In contrast, most standard firm-level variables, on their own, are not predictive of issuance. Consistent with the carry trade motive, we find that firms with low leverage are most likely to take advantage of these favorable funding conditions; firm cash holdings rise more after a foreign currency debt issue than after an equivalent amount raised through other sources; and firm exposure to foreign exchange risk rises after an issuance implying that the currency risk is not fully hedged. Using the ‘taper tantrum’ episode of Summer 2013 as an unexpected shock to foreign exchange volatility, we find that a market-based measure of FX exposure does a better job in capturing firm exposures than accounting measures. Firms with high FX exposure and a propensity to issue in more favorable funding environments are the hardest hit during the taper tantrum episode. Finally, we also present suggestive evidence that risks spill over to local banks from foreign currency borrowers with whom they have relationships.

Using changes in the composition of the US House Financial Services Committee as a shock to a region’s political importance, I provide evidence that financial institutions alter lending patterns depending on whether a county is represented by a member of the committee. The effects are asymmetric – on gaining a member, counties see no immediate change but on losing a member, there is a decline in home mortgage loans originated. This asymmetry is consistent with models that emphasize reputation building in the market for political favors. Effects are greater where the politician receives less direct contributions suggesting that these indirect contributions might be substitutes for direct giving. In the presence of limits on campaign contributions, these results emphasize alternate channels that firms may employ to influence politicians.